Intermediate goods, however, act as a multiplier for price stickiness: a little price rigidity at the level of an individual firm leads to a large degree of economy-wide price inflexibility.
The reason is straightforward. The representative firm is connected by a complex input-output relationship to many other firms. But each firm cares only about the ratio of its price to its marginal cost of production; an increase in aggregate demand induces a firm to raise its price only to the extent that its profits are squeezed between a fixed output price and rising input costs. With intermediate goods in production, the increase in firms' costs depends on whether other firms raise prices. So in response to a demand shock, each firm simply "waits by the mailbox" to see if other firms have raised their prices. If other prices go up, then the firm will also be obliged to raise its own price. But if all firms follow this reasonable strategy, no input prices -and hence no output prices -will increase. In the limit as intermediate goods become the only variable input to production, firms never change prices and output is determined solely by aggregate demand. Carlton's (1986) analysis of this data set showed that for some substances, particularly steel, paper, chemicals, stone, and glass products, prices can be rigid for long periods of time -in some cases years. 3 2 Therefore intermediate goods are a "real rigidity" in the sense in which the term is used by Ball and Romer (1990) . However the real rigidities that they provide as examples are all auxiliary assumptions about the behavior of labor or product markets -e.g. efficiency wages and kinked demand curves -whose existence and extent are controversial. By contrast, usage of intermediate goods is a widespread and easily documented feature of the production process in any modem economy.
3 In fact, Canton's results imply so much price rigidity that some (perhaps including Cadton) have refused to believe that these prices are allocative. Instead, they hold that long-term relationships between buyers and suppliers make the observed spot prices a bad indicator of the true shadow cost of intermediate inputs. If this were true, however, then there should be a strong positive correlation between the observed rigidity of input prices and the length of buyer-seller association. But in fact, Carlton finds a negarive relationship between price rigidity and the length of association, making it unlikely that the "installment payment" interpretation of price rigidity is correct.
In the paper, I present evidence that intermediate goods prices are less procyclical than labor costs. This also is consistent with my hypothesis that prices of intermediate goods are relatively rigid.
There is a similarity between the conclusion of this part of the paper and that of Olivier J. Given this difference between the two models, one might ask whether production should in fact be modeled as an input-output process, or as an irreversible chain where goods move in only one direction down the stages of processing. While the "chain of production" seems plausible primafiacie, it naturally leads one to ask whether in the real world there are empirically relevant "first goods," the ones produced without any intermediate inputs. Input-output studies certainly do not support the chain-of-production view; even the most detailed input-output tables show surprisingly few zeros. 4 Empirically, the biggest source of any industry's inputs is usually itself: that is, the diagonal entries of input-output matrices are almost always the largest elements of each column (see BEA, 1984) . This seems to lend credence to the view of "roundabout" rather than "in-line" production. 
Blanchard (1983)
The price level is, of course, homogeneous of degree one in all prices. The consumer maximizes (1) subject to a standard budget constraint; the first order conditions are derived in the Appendix.
The production side of the economy is composed of a continuum of monopolistic firms, each producing one variety of product. Each firm maximizes profits, given the production function Q=1LV a I assume that all goods can serve either as final outputs or as inputs for the production of other goods.
There is, therefore, no distinction between firms producing manufactured inputs and those producing final goods -all firms produce for both markets. For simplicity, I also assume that firms' elasticity of substitution between manufactured inputs in production is the same as consumers' elasticity of substitution between goods in consumption. 6 Finally, I take the aggregate production function to be constant returns to scale and Cobb-Douglas, with the share of nonproduced inputs (here only labor) being a.
Under these conditions, each firm's profit-maximizing nominal price, P*, is
where p is the markup, W is the nominal wage, and k is an unimportant constant. Money is put in the utility function as a shortcut for generating money demand. s I have assumed a constant disutility of labor. Note that the assumption of additive separability makes the quantity of any product consumed independent of the prices of all other products.
The price level, P is defined by
The alternative is to simply write down Y=M/P, as in Ball and Romer (1989, 1990) . Putting money in the utility function generates a similar aggregate demand relationship, except that the elasticity of aggregate demand with respect to real balances becomes 1/$ rather than one.
6 This simplification is inessential for any of the results below. Its only purpose is to ensure that firms face a constant elasticity of substitution demand curve for their output. 7 See the Appendix for details.
It follows from the equality of the wage and the nominal money supply shown in the Appendix 8 that the optimal relative price for each firm i, pt*, is
The important point to note about (4) is that the optimal relative price depends upon real balances raised to the power a. rather than to the power 1 as in the simple menu cost model of Mankiw (1991) . 8 The relation W=M follows from the assumption of a constant disutility of labor. A constant disutility of labor makes the real wage less procyclical than it otherwise would be, and therefore understates the reduction in cyclicality of marginal cost from introducing Intermediate goods. In Section III, it also makes markups less countercyclical than they would otherwise be. Thus, the assumption actually works against the results of the paper.
It does, however, simplify the model considerably. 9 There are actually many conjectural variations that firms could make. In general, each would conjecture that k% of all other firms in the economy would change their prices in response to the money shock. The standard assumption In the menu cost literature Is Implicitly that firms take k=0. So each firm contemplates a change in the price of its own product, assuming that no other firm will change its price.
To a second order approximation, the change in profit to a firm from not adjusting its price in response to a monetary shock is given by "(9 "99 2 ""P)(' Table 2 gives the profit loss for a one percent money shock, normalized as before so that it is a fraction of the profit loss for a= 1.
The third line reports these losses in absolute terms, as percentages of profit. (1987) present a model that has the first and second features, but not the third. In their model, the presence of markup pricing distorts the labor-leisure choice but not producers' decisions about the mix of inputs to employ: since they assume that labor is the only input to production, there is no "input mix" to distort. Thus, even though higher levels of output raise welfare in their model, this increase in welfare does not raise productivity. But when manufactured inputs are used in production, markup pricing also makes firms' production decisions socially suboptimal. In particular, at the initial equilibrium firms use too much of the primary input, labor, and too few manufactured inputs. In this model, the decrease in markups that accompanies output movements causes the ratio of input prices to be closer to the marginal rate of transformation between goods and labor. Thus, firms making their input choices make decisions about the quantity of labor to employ versus the quantity of manufactured inputs to use that are closer to being socially optimal. This increase in social efficiency not only increases welfare, it also raises productivity.
So far the discussion of the paper has used gross output as the concept of production. However, gross output is the total output of a firm, including the output used by other firms as intermediate goods.
But the efficiency of an economy is judged by its ability to produce final goods from a given quantity of non-produced inputs (here only labor). So the correct statistic to examine is value added relative to labor, rather than gross output relative to labor.
To examine the issue of cyclical productivity, we first derive the economy-wide (and sectoral) value-added production function. Since labor is the only input to production and there are constant returns to scale, we can represent the net output or value-added production function as
where A is this economy's "total factor productivity."
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We wish to examine the change in productivity as a function of the change in value added, assuming that menu costs are large enough to prevent prices from changing in response to the money shock that causes the output expansion. Alternatively, one can view the output movement as an expansion 16 Since the gross-output production function (2) is separable in labor and materials, a value-added function exists. In fact, since the production function is Cobb-Douglas, a value-added function would exist even if there were more than one primary input (capital and labor, for instance).
of real aggregate demand in a flexible-price model where, for any of the reasons given in the models cited above, a one percent increase in final output is accompanied by an e4 percent reduction in the markup.
The percent change in A is derived from this experiment. Taking the appropriate derivatives and evaluating the resulting expression at the real wage that prevails at the initial equilibrium yields:
A - Values for the coefficient in (9) are reported in the fourth line of Table 2 It is evident that the bias is a positive one (since productivity comoves positively with labor input).
Calculations of the size of this bias are given in Table 3 . Again, computations for the calibrated parameter values are reported in the last line of Table 2 . These show that for some admissible values of the relevant parameters, the bias can be large.
This result provides one way to pin down the calibration of the model. The bias of svA relative to t found in (12) and the bias of p* relative to svA found in (13) The first line of Table 4 reports the estimate of 8 (with the elasticity constrained to be equal across industries). The elasticity is negative and significant, as the model predicts. 
B. Specific Predictions
In this section I test the more specific predictions of the model. 
The result is found in the last line of Table 4 ; 83 is positive and significant. Note that if the production function is in fact Cobb-Douglas, the estimated coefficient in this regression should be a. The coefficient is 0.12, which is in line with the calibrated value of a: based on evidence regarding the size of the markup, a was predicted to be between 0.2 and 0.1.
Next I test the prediction that changes in the input mix are responsible for changes in total factor productivity. Here, however, there is the problem with labor hoarding discussed above. If there is a significant degree of unmeasured factor utilization that applies to labor but not to intermediate goods, the measured procyclicality of total factor productivity and of the intermediate goods-labor ratio may both be driven by cyclical measurement error. There is a way to distinguish these two hypotheses, however. To the extent that cyclical measurement error is driving the finding of procyclical productivity, this effect should be apparent in both gross-output and value-added data. However, as argued above, the procyclicality resulting from countercyclical markups should be found only in value added. This suggests that we should regress two different measures of the Solow residual on changes in the materials-labor ratio -one measure calculated from gross output and the other from value added. If the value-added estimate is significantly larger, this will imply that the mechanism identified in the paper is at work. So I estimate ATFPk = constants + B 4 (AMk -ALu)
In calculating the growth rate of total factor productivity, I use cost shares 37 rather than revenue shares to avoid the problem pointed out by Hall ( The results of the test using total factor productivity are reported in Table 5 . Note first that there is evidence of significant procyclicality of the gross-output residual (ATFPGO) in response to changes in the materials-labor ratio. Therefore, as indicated above, part of the movement in this ratio most likely reflects changes in unmeasured labor utilization. However, it is also clear that the value-added estimate significantly exceeds -by almost a factor of three -the gross-output estimate. Therefore, although it appears that some of the correlation between total factor productivity and changes in the materials-labor ratio reflect labor hoarding, the data support the contention that some other mechanism like the one identified here is also at work.
Finally, I test the prediction that if the mechanism proposed by the model is responsible for the finding that procyclical productivity is an external effect, we should be able to detect the effect in value-37 The cost shares are calculated as in Hall (1990) . However, I use capital-specific depreciation rates and tax parameters (the investment tax credit and the present value of depreciation allowances) that vary by industry.
added data but not in gross-output data. 38 The empirical procedure follows Caballero and Lyons (1990b).
I estimate the equation:
where AXs is the cost share-weighted sum of sectoral input growths, and AX is growth of aggregate ( 2 Also computed for a one percent shock to money. 
